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Abstract. In this sequence of papers, noncommutative analysis is used to give a
consistent axiomatic approach to a unified conceptual foundation of classical and
quantum physics.
The present Part I defines the concepts of observables, states and ensembles, clar-
ifies the logical relations and operations for them, and shows how they give rise to
dynamics and probabilities.
States are identified with maximal consistent sets of weak equalities in the algebra
of observables (instead of, as usual, with the rays in a Hilbert space). This leads
to a concise foundation of quantum mechanics, free of undefined terms, separating
in a clear way the deterministic and the stochastic features of quantum physics.
The traditional postulates of quantum mechanics are derived from well-motivated
axiomatic assumptions. No special quantum logic is needed to handle the pecu-
liarities of quantum mechanics. Foundational problems associated with the mea-
surement process, such as the reduction of the state vector, disappear.
The new interpretation of quantum mechanics contains ‘elements of physical re-
ality’ without the need to introduce a classical framework with hidden variables.
In particular, one may talk about the state of the universe without the need of
an external observer and without the need to assume the existence of multiple
universes.
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1 Introduction
“Look,” they say, “here is something new!” But no, it has
all happened before, long before we were born.
(Good News Bible, Eccl. 1:10)
Do not imagine, any more than I can bring myself to imag-
ine, that I should be right in undertaking so great and
difficult a task. Remembering what I said at first about
probability, I will do my best to give as probable an expla-
nation as any other – or rather, more probable; and I will
first go back to the beginning and try to speak of each thing
and of all.
Plato, ca. 367 B.C. [39]
After more than eleven years of long and exciting, often also very frustrating
investigations into the foundations of physics, one of the most foggy regions
of the Platonic world, the fog finally cleared. In the light of the morning sun,
the continent of quantum physics appears as a well-organized, comprehensible
and beautiful part of the Platonic world of precise ideas.
The present paper is the first one of a series of papers that spell out the fruits
of my journeys, designed to give a mathematically elementary and philosoph-
ically consistent foundation of modern theoretical physics, presented in the
framework of noncommutative analysis. It is an attempt to reconsider, from
a more modern point of view, Hilbert’s [14] sixth problem, the axiomatiza-
tion of theoretical physics. It is an attempt only since at the present stage of
development, I have not yet tried to achieve full mathematical rigor every-
where. (However, Parts I and II are completely rigorous, and in later parts
it is explicitly mentioned where the standard of rigor is relaxed.)
One of the basic premises throughout my years of search was that the split
between classical physics and quantum physics should be as small as possi-
ble. This is optimally realized in the set-up proposed here. Except in the
examples, the formalism never distinguishes between the classical and the
quantum situation. Thus it can be considered as a consequent implementa-
tion of Bohr’s correspondence principle. This also has didactical advantages
for teaching: Students can be trained to be acquainted with the formalism
by means of intuitive, primarily classical examples at first. Later, without
having to unlearn anything, they can apply the same formalism to quantum
phenomena.
The present Part I is concerned with giving a concise foundation by defin-
ing the concepts of observables, states and ensembles, clarifying the logical
relations and operations for them, and showing how they give rise to the
2
traditional postulates of quantum mechanics, including dynamics and prob-
abilities.
Much of what is done here is common wisdom in quantum mechanics; how-
ever, the new interpretation slightly shifts the meaning of some concepts,
fixing them in a way such as to forbid certain identifications that gave rise
to the riddles of quantum philosophy. Traditional interpretations always
assumed without reflection the validity of the equation
ideal measurement = state of the system = pure prepared state.
The new approach differentiates between the three concepts and gives each
one a distinct meaning. In particular, we shall strictly distinguish between
states, measurement and preparation. This helps to clarify the meaning of
these concepts and reduces the danger of paradoxical conclusions.
By identifying states with maximal consistent sets of weak equalities in the
algebra of observables (instead of, as usual, with the rays in a Hilbert space),
a concise foundation of quantum mechanics is given, free of undefined terms.
The deterministic and the stochastic features of quantum physics are sep-
arated in a clear way. No special quantum logic is needed to handle the
peculiarities of quantum mechanics. Foundational problems associated with
the measurement process, such as the reduction of the state vector, disap-
pear.
The new interpretation of quantum mechanics contains elements of physical
reality in the sense of Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen [9], without the need
to introduce a classical framework with hidden variables (cf. my analysis of
flaws in the traditional mathematical arguments against realism in [29]). In
particular, one may talk about the state of the universe without the need of
an external observer and without the need to assume the existence of multiple
universes.
To motivate the new conceptual foundation and to place it into context, I
found it useful to embed the formalism into my philosophy of physics, while
strictly separating the mathematics by using the classical definition-example-
theorem-proof exposition style. Though I present my view generally without
using subjunctive formulations or qualifying phrases, I do not claim that this
is the only way to understand physics. Thus I do not attempt to refute any of
the alternative interpretations or any arguments why particular philosophical
positions close to the one I maintain are not compelling. However, I do
attempt to give a vivid picture of the particular philosophical view that gave
me the vision to find the new foundation. And I believe that this view
is consistent with the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and
accomodates naturally a number of puzzling questions about the nature of
the world.
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Section 2 motivates and introduces the basic concepts of statements, selec-
tions, and states, and how they are realized in classical physics and quantum
mechanics. This section also spells out the relation of the new interpretation
to the traditional concepts of states and ideal measurement. Section 3 then
discusses the properties of selections and states in more detail, and in par-
ticular shows that there are states that cannot be described by a single ideal
measurement.
In Section 4 we discuss elementary aspects of the dynamics of physical sys-
tems, as far as relevant for the new interpretation. In Section 5, we look at
the way ensembles and probabilities arise in the new interpretation, and in
Section 6 we consider the implications about the uncertainties inherent in
state preparation and measurement.
The Section 7 concludes the main exposition by relating the new interpreta-
tion to more general philosophical questions. We discuss a particular philo-
sophical position, namely that quantum physics should be regarded to be as
deterministic as classical physics, and that the stochastic features arise from
the impossibility of preparing deterministic states, due to the uncertainty
principle. We look at the borderline between objective existence and sub-
jective judgment, and we reconsider the unreasonable effectiveness of math-
ematics in the natural sciences (Wigner [54]).
Subsequent parts of this sequence of papers will present a differential calcu-
lus based on Poisson algebras and its application to the dynamics of physical
systems [31], the calculus of integration [32] and its application to equilib-
rium thermodynamics [33], a relativistic covariant Hamiltonian multiparticle
theory, and its application to nonequilibrium thermodynamics and quantum
field theory.
Acknowledgments. I’d like to thank Hermann Schichl, Tapio Schneider
and Karl Svozil for discussions that led to improvements of the present text,
and Waltraud Huyer for pointing out the need to allow nonhermitian observ-
ables to get Proposition 2.7(iv).
2 Statements and states
How wonderful are the things the Lord does! All who are
delighted with them want to understand them.
(Good News Bible, Psalm 111:2)
All our scientific knowledge is based on past observation, and only gives
rise to conjectures about the future. Mathematical consistency requires that
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our choices are constrained by some formal laws. When we want to predict
something, the true answer depends on knowledge we do not have. We can
calculate at best approximations whose accuracy can be estimated using
statistical techniques (assuming that the quality of our models is good).
This implies that we must distinguish between quantities (formal concepts
of what can possibly be measured or calculated) and numbers (the results of
measurements and calculations themselves); those quantities that are con-
stant by the nature of the concept considered behave just like numbers.
Comparison with experiment exclusively concerns expectations of quantities,
numbers associated to the quantities in a precise way depending on the prepa-
ration of an experiment (cf. Sections 5 and 6).
In quantum mechanics (see, e.g., Jammer [17, 18], Jauch [19], von Neu-
mann [34], Messiah [27]), observables are identified with certain elements
of the algebra E of bounded linear operators in a Hilbert space. However, the
Hilbert space has no operational physical interpretation; hence we shall drop
it from our main line of discussion, and resurrect it only to give examples.
On the other hand, the algebra E is essential. Physicists are used to calculat-
ing with quantities that they may add and multiply without restrictions; if
the quantities are complex, the complex conjugate can also be formed. Thus
we take as primitive objects of our treatment a set E of quantities, such that
the sum and the product of quantities is again a quantity, and there is an
operation generalizing complex conjugation.
Operations on quantities are required to satisfy a few simple rules; they
are called axioms since we take them as a formal starting point without
making any further demands on the nature of the symbols we are using. Our
axioms are motivated by the wish to be as general as possible while still
preserving the ability to manipulate quantities in the manner familiar from
matrix algebra. (Similar axioms for quantities have been proposed, e.g., by
Dirac [6] and Thirring [50].)
2.1 Definition.
(i) E denotes a set whose elements are called quantities. For any two quan-
tities f, g ∈ E, the sum f + g, the product fg, and the conjugate f ∗ are
also quantities, and the following axioms (O1)–(O5) are assumed to hold for
f, g, h ∈ E and α ∈ C.
(O1) C ⊆ E, i.e., complex numbers are special quantities, where addition,
multiplication and conjugation have their traditional meaning.
(O2) (fg)h = f(gh), αf = fα, 0f = 0, 1f = f .
(O3) (f + g) + h = f + (g + h), f(g + h) = fg + fh, f + 0 = f .
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(O4) f ∗∗ = f , (fg)∗ = g∗f ∗, (f + g)∗ = f ∗ + g∗,
(O5) f ∗f = 0 ⇒ f = 0.
(ii) We introduce the traditional notation
−f := (−1)f, f − g := f + (−g), [f, g] := fg − gf,
f 0 := 1, f l := f l−1f (l = 1, 2, . . .),
Re f =
1
2
(f + f ∗), Im f =
1
2i
(f − f ∗).
(iii) A quantity f ∈ E is calledHermitian if f ∗ = f , and normal if [f, f ∗] =
0. We refer to normal quantities as observables, and we denote by
Aobs = {f ∈ A | [f, f
∗] = 0}
the observable part of a subset A of E.
(Note that every Hermitian quantity is normal and hence an observable. But
our definition also allows certain nonhermitian observables.)
We shall see that, for the general, qualitative aspects of the theory there is no
need to know any details of how to actually perform calculations with quanti-
ties; this is only needed if one wants to calculate specific properties for specific
systems. In this respect, the situation is quite similar to the traditional ax-
iomatic treatment of real numbers: The axioms specify the permitted ways
to handle formulas involving these numbers; and this is enough to derive
calculus, say, without the need to specify either what real numbers are or al-
gorithmic rules for addition, multiplication and division. Of course, the latter
are needed when one wants to do specific calculations but not while one tries
to get insight into a problem. And as the development of pocket calculators
has shown, the capacity for understanding theory and that for knowing the
best ways of calculation need not even reside in the same person.
Note that we assume commutativity only between numbers and quantities.
However, commutativity of the addition is a consequence of our other as-
sumptions:
2.2 Proposition. For all quantities f , g, h ∈ E,
(f + g)h = fh+ gh, f − f = 0, f + g = g + f.
Proof. The right distributive law follows from
(f + g)h = ((f + g)h)∗∗ = (h∗(f + g)∗)∗ = (h∗(f ∗ + g∗))∗
= (h∗f ∗ + h∗g∗)∗ = (h∗f ∗)∗ + (h∗g∗)∗
= f ∗∗h∗∗ + g∗∗h∗∗ = fh+ gh.
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It implies f − f = 1f − 1f = (1− 1)f = 0f = 0. From this, we may deduce
that addition is commutative, as follows. The quantity h := −f + g satisfies
−h = (−1)((−1)f + g) = (−1)(−1)f + (−1)g = f − g,
and we have
f+g = f+(h−h)+g = (f+h)+(−h+g) = (f−f+g)+(f−g+g) = g+f.
⊓⊔
Thus, in conventional terminology (see, e.g., Rickart [40]), E is a nonde-
generate *-algebra with unity, but not necessarily with a commutative
multiplication. As the example E = Cn×n (with complex numbers identified
with the scalar multiples of the identity matrix) shows, E may have zero
divisors, and not every nonzero quantity need have an inverse. Therefore, in
the manipulation of formulas, precisely the same precautions must be taken
as in ordinary matrix algebra.
A statement is the assertion of some pieces of information available about a
system in a given state or set of states. We base our new interpretation on
the assumption that the elementary pieces of information are assertions of
weak equality f ≈ g between quantities f, g ∈ E.
The logical structure of the theory is defined by axioms for valid inference;
these state how valid statements may be combined to give further valid state-
ments. Axioms (R1)–(R3) below express reflexivity, symmetry and transitiv-
ity, (R4) says that we may add arbitrary quantities to both sides of a weak
equality, and (R5) says that we may multiply weak equalities from the left by
arbitrary quantities. On the other hand, (R6) restricts the addition of weak
equalities to those where all four terms are mutually commuting observables.
This is an expression of von Neumann’s [34] observations that the sum of
two observables f, g has a natural interpretation in terms of f and g only
when these and their conjugates all commute with each other. Thus weak
equality is indeed a weaker concept than standard equality.
2.3 Definition.
(i) A statement is a relation ≈ on E. We say that f, g ∈ E are weakly
equal if f ≈ g, and that f ∈ E vanishes if f ≈ 0. In particular, a single
weak equality is considered to be a statement.
(ii) A statement ≈ is logically closed if, for all f, g, h ∈ E,
(R1) f ≈ f ,
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(R2) f ≈ g ⇒ g ≈ f ,
(R3) f ≈ g, g ≈ h ⇒ f ≈ h,
(R4) f ≈ g ⇒ f + h ≈ g + h,
(R5) f ≈ g ⇒ hf ≈ hg,
and, for all f, g, f ′, g′ ∈ Eobs commuting with each other and with their
conjugates,
(R6) f ≈ g, f ′ ≈ g′ ⇒ f + f ′ ≈ g + g′.
(Note that f ≈ g usually does not imply f ∗ ≈ g∗!)
(iii) The logical closure of a family of statements ≈l (l ∈ L) is the logically
closed statement ≈ with the fewest weak equalities satisfying
f ≈l g ⇒ f ≈ g
for all l and all f, g ∈ E. We say that any subset of weak equalities in
the logical closure can be inferred from the statements ≈l (l ∈ L). The
statements ≈l (l ∈ L) are called consistent if 1 ≈ 0 cannot be inferred from
them.
Traditional quantum logic (Birkhoff & von Neumann [1], see also Svozil
[49]) can be regarded as the theory of weak equalities e ≈ 0 or e ≈ 1 for or-
thogonal projectors e. (We shall use these projectors in Section 5 for counting
events.) However, there is no intrinsic reason in the quantum mechanical for-
malism why only these statements should be admissible.
With our definition, there is no special need for a quantum logic. The only
logic to be used is the classical logic for handling inferences about statements,
with the rules (R1)–(R6) and standard logical operations and quantors. This
is satisfying since, indeed, classical logic is used in practice to handle virtually
all applications of quantum mechanics.
2.4 Examples.
(i) Classical physics. Classical physics happens in a set Ω called the phase
space, and E is an algebra of bounded functions f : Ω→ C.
If B is an open subset of Rm and p is a vector of commuting Hermitian
observables pj (j = 1, . . . , m), we denote by p ≈∈ B (“p is weakly in B”)
the statement that all quantities F (p) ∈ E with bounded F : Rm → C and
support disjoint from B vanish. (If B is not open, p ≈∈ B is taken to mean
p ≈∈ B′ for all open B′ containing B.)
In the particular case where B is the open ball with center k ∈ Rn and
radius ε > 0, we denote this statement by ‖p−k‖ ≈< ε (“‖p−k‖ is weakly
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smaller than ε”). It represents the assertion that a measurement of p would
give with certainty a value that deviates from k by less than ε.
(ii)Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. In nonrelativistic quantum me-
chanics, E is the algebra of bounded linear operators in the Hilbert space
L2(Ω), where Ω is the direct product of Rn and a finite set S that takes care
of spin, color, and similar indices. (In contrast to the classical case, Ω is
only ‘half’ of phase space!) The statements p ≈∈ B and ‖p− k‖ ≈< ε have
precisely the same definition and interpretation as in the classical case.
(iii) One of the nontrivial traditional postulates of quantum mechanics, that
the possible values an observable f may take are the elements of the spectrum
Spec f of f , is in the new interpretation a simple consequence of the trivial
axioms (R1)–(R5); Let f ∈ E, λ ∈ C.
If the weak equality f ≈ λ can be deduced from a consistent statement then
λ ∈ Spec f .
Indeed, if this is not the case then g := (λ − f)−1 exists. By (R5), f ≈ λ
implies gf ≈ gλ, hence 1 = g(λ− f) = gλ− gf ≈ 0 by (R4), contradiction.
Note that this holds both in classical physics and in quantum mechanics (and
more generally whenever E is a Banach *-algebra [40]).
Because of (R4) we may restrict attention to weak equalities where one side
is zero. We therefore define the concept of a selection that serves to char-
acterize the set of vanishing quantities that can be inferred from a given set
of statements. A selection can be thought of as containing all information
deducible from partial knowledge about a system in a given state.
2.5 Definition.
(i) A selection is a nonempty subset Π of E such that
(S1) f ∈ E, g ∈ Π ⇒ fg ∈ Π,
(S2) f, g ∈ Πobs, [f, g] = [f, g
∗] = 0 ⇒ f + g ∈ Π.
A selection is called ideal if, in place of (S2), the stronger statement
(S2a) f, g ∈ Π ⇒ f + g ∈ Π,
holds, and valid if 1 6∈ Π. We denote the set of selections by P.
(ii) A state is a maximal valid selection, i.e., a valid selection Σ such that
Σ ⊆ Π ∈ P, Π 6= Σ ⇒ 1 ∈ Π.
(iii) A set of selections is called consistent if their union is contained in a
valid selection. Two selections Π, Π′ are called orthogonal (and we write
Π ⊥ Π′) if
f ∈ Π, g ∈ Π′ ⇒ fg∗ = 0.
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An inconsistent pair of orthogonal selections is called an alternative.
(iv) A statement ≈ is called true in the state Σ if
f − g ∈ Σ for all f, g ∈ E with f ≈ g,
and false otherwise.
2.6 Proposition.
(i) The set of f ∈ E for which f ≈ 0 can be inferred from a given family of
statements is a selection.
(ii) If Π is a selection then the relation ≈ defined by
f ≈ g ⇔ f − g ∈ Π
is a logically closed statement.
Proof. This follows directly from the definitions. ⊓⊔
A state contains all possible information about a system, as far as it is ac-
cessible within the framework of the theory. It asserts a maximal set Σ of
vanishing objects, hence of weak equalities, that does not yet contain invalid
information that would allow to conclude the equation 1 ≈ 0, i.e., 1 ∈ Σ. By
maximality, adding any additional information, i.e., a statement f ≈ g with
f − g 6∈ Σ, would allow to deduce the invalid statement 1 ≈ 0.
In traditional terminology, a maximal valid ideal selection is a maximal left
ideal of E. If E is the algebra of bounded linear operators in a separable
Hilbert space then every set of the form
Πψ = {f ∈ E | fψ = 0}
for some vector ψ 6= 0 is a maximal left ideal. Conversely, all closed maximal
left ideals have this form. Clearly Πψ depends only on the ray Cψ spanned
by ψ. Thus, in this case, the closed ideal selections that are maximal among
the valid ones are in one-to-one correspondence with the rays in the Hilbert
space, i.e., with the traditional quantum mechanical pure states.
According to established quantum mechanical thinking (as codified for ex-
ample in von Neumann [34]), an ideal measurement defines a quantum
mechanical pure state. It corresponds to a set of weak equalities (assertions
true in this ‘pure state’), maximal with respect to the restriction that it can
(in principle) be verified by an instantaneous experiment. (See, e.g.,Wigner
[56, pp.284-288] for details on the instantaneous approximations involved in
ideal measurements.)
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However, as we shall see soon, our concept of a state is essentially different
from the traditional pure state of quantum mechanics. This has very interest-
ing consequences for the interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particular,
it seems now conceivable that the simultaneous assertion of precise values for
position and momentum are consistent (cf. Problem 3.7(iv) below).
This is the decisive difference. In the traditional interpretations, closed maxi-
mal left ideals (rays) are associated with pure states obtained by a mysterious
process called an ‘ideal measurement’, supposedly achieved by ‘state reduc-
tion’ through contact with a classical measuring apparatus (ill-defined since
‘classical’ has no meaning in the formalism). And there are severe interpre-
tational problems with ‘superpositions of pure states’ that cannot be given
a classical meaning.
In the present interpretation, measurements no longer figure in the concep-
tual basis (though they can be idealized as being represented by certain ideal
selections), and states are not related to measurement but to the maximal
possible information that can be asserted without contradiction, namely that
certain quantities are weakly equal.
Therefore, the relation of actual experimental measurements to ideal mea-
surements is no longer a matter obscuring the foundations of physics, but
a thermodynamical question concerning the interaction of a system with a
macroscopic, dissipation-producing measuring apparatus (cf., e.g., Davies
[5], Busch et al. [4], Zurek [57], Joos & Zeh [20], Ghirardi, Rimini &
Weber [12]).
The new interpretation has no longer a place for mysteries since all concepts
used in the interpretation have precise definitions. In particular, there is no
state reduction, except approximately, as far as thermodynamical arguments
apply. And what was before a ‘superposition of pure states’ is now simply a
particular set of valid weak equations, without any spooky associations.
2.7 Proposition. Let E be an arbitrary *-algebra.
(i) The only invalid selection is Π = E.
(ii) Every set of the form
Π = Eg = {fg | f ∈ E},
is an ideal selection.
(iii) If fg∗ = 0 then Ef and Eg are orthogonal selections. In particular, if
e2 = e = e∗ then Ee and E(1− e) form an alternative.
(iv) If E is commutative, every selection is ideal.
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Proof. (i) If Π is invalid then 1 ∈ Π and by (S1) every f ∈ E is in Π. Hence
Π = E.
(ii) and (iii) are straightforward.
(iv) Since E is commutative, every quantity is normal, hence Πobs = Π. Thus,
since any two quantities commute, (S2) implies (S2a), i.e., Π is ideal. ⊓⊔
2.8 Example. (Classical physics)
For a set Ω, consider the algebra E of bounded functions f : Ω → C. It is
easy to see that an ideal selection Π is characterized by the set
Πˆ = {ω ∈ Ω | f(ω) = 0 for all f ∈ Π}
of points annihilating Π. Indeed, given Πˆ, the ideal selection Π can be
reconstructed from this set as Π =
ˆˆ
Π, where, for W ⊆ Ω,
Wˆ = {f ∈ E | f(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ W}.
Conversely, any Wˆ is an ideal selection. The maximal ideals are obtained for
W = {ω},
Πω = {f ∈ E | f(ω) = 0}
with ω ∈ Ω, in one-to-one correspondence with the points of Ω. By Proposi-
tion 2.7, every selection Π is ideal, and the states are just the maximal valid
ideal selections. Thus the set Ω can be identified with the set of possible
states, a selection Π is equivalent to finding out that the system measured is
in one of the states ω ∈ Πˆ, and an ideal measurement is equivalent to finding
the precise state of the system. This is typical for classical physics, based on
a commutative *-algebra E.
2.9 Example. (Discretized quantum physics)
In the algebra E = Cn×n of n × n-matrices with complex entries, the ideal
selections Π are characterized by their row space
Πˆ = {φ∗f | φ ∈ Cn, f ∈ Π}.
Indeed, given Πˆ, the ideal selection Π can be reconstructed from this vector
space as Π =
ˆˆ
Π, where, for vector spaces W of row vectors of length n,
Wˆ = {f ∈ Cn×n | φ∗f ∈ W for all φ ∈ Cn}.
Conversely, any Wˆ is an ideal selection. The maximal ideal selections are
obtained by choosing for W a hyperplane,
Wψ = {φ
∗ | φ ∈ Cn, φ∗ψ = 0}
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for some nonzero ψ ∈ Cn. Hence they have the form
Π = Wˆψ = {f ∈ C
n×n | fψ = 0}.
Since Wˆψ does not change when ψ is multiplied by a nonzero number, the
maximal valid ideal selections (and hence the ideal measurements) are in
one-to-one correspondence with the rays Cψ with ψ ∈ Cn\{0}. However, as
we shall see in Section 3, there are many selections that are not ideal, and
the maximal ideal selections are no longer states. This is typical for quantum
physics (though there one generally has a Hilbert space in place of Cn, and
topological considerations modify the results a little.)
3 Properties of selections and states
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than
are dreamt of in your philosophy.
W. Shakespeare, 1602 A.D. [44]
To prove in general the existence of states, we need Zorn’s Lemma (see, e.g.,
Kelley [21]), a well-known consequence of the axiom of choice.
3.1 Lemma. (Zorn)
Let F be a family of sets with the chain property,
(C) The union of every subfamily of F , linearly ordered by inclusion, is
contained in some element of F .
Then F contains a maximal element.
3.2 Theorem.
(i) Every valid selection is contained in some state.
(ii) Every valid ideal selection is contained in a maximal one.
Proof. (i) We have to prove that for every valid selection Π there is a maximal
valid selection Σ containing Π. But the form of the axioms (S1) and (S2)
implies that the set of selections has the chain property. Hence the assertion
follows from Zorn’s Lemma.
(ii) Similarly, the set of valid ideal selections has the chain property, and
Zorn’s lemma applies. ⊓⊔
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Thus states always exist, though our proof is not constructive. In fact, Zorn’s
Lemma is equivalent to the axiom of choice, and hence cannot be made con-
structive; so it would be desirable to find a constructive proof for the case of
*-algebras of physical interest. On the other hand, this nonconstructiveness
might possibly raise interesting decidability problems for statements about
physics.
We now proceed to get further insight into the properties of selections and
states.
3.3 Proposition.
(i) The intersection of an arbitrary set of selections is again a selection.
(ii) The intersection of an arbitrary set of ideal selections is again an ideal
selection.
(iii) Every subset A ⊆ E is contained in a unique smallest selection A¯, the
intersection of all selections containing A. In particular, writing f¯ = {f}, we
have
0¯ = {0}, 1¯ = E.
(iv) For every subset A ⊆ E, the orthogonal complement of A, defined by
A⊥ = {f | fg∗ = 0 for all g ∈ A} (1)
is an ideal selection.
Proof. Straightforward. ⊓⊔
3.4 Proposition. Two selections Π and Π′ satisfying 1 ∈ Πobs + Π
′
obs are
inconsistent.
Proof. Let Π′′ be a selection containing Π and Π′. If 1 ∈ Πobs + Π
′
obs then
there is a quantity f ∈ Πobs such that 1 − f ∈ Π
′
obs. Hence f, 1 − f ∈ Π
′′
obs.
Since [f, 1− f ] = [f, 1− f ∗] = 0, (S2) implies 1 = f + (1− f) ∈ Π′′. ⊓⊔
We now show that, in the quantum case, there are valid selections not covered
by an ideal selection.
3.5 Theorem. Let Ψ be a set of vectors in a Hilbert space H of dimension
> 1 such that distinct vectors in Ψ are neither parallel nor orthogonal. Then
Π1(Ψ) := {φψ
∗ | φ ∈ H, ψ ∈ Ψ}
is a valid selection in the algebra of bounded linear operators on H.
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Proof. Clearly, (S1) is satisfied. Two nonzero operators f = φψ∗ and g =
φ′ψ′∗ commute iff φ′ ‖ φ and ψ′ ‖ ψ, and the assumptions on Ψ then imply
that ψ′ = ψ. Hence (S2) also holds. ⊓⊔
Note that it is easy to choose Ψ in many ways such that the subspace spanned
by Π1(Ψ) coincides with the space of all finite rank operators on H. The
corresponding sets Π1(Ψ) are valid selections not contained in a valid ideal
selection. In particular, by Theorem 3.2, this implies that there are states
not contained in a valid ideal selection (and hence not obtainable by an ideal
measurement).
In the smallest noncommutative *-algebra E = C2×2, describing a single
quantum spin, it is even possible to describe all possible selections, and hence
all possible states, explicitly.
3.6 Theorem.
(i) Every selection Π 6= 0¯, 1¯ of E = C2×2 has the form Π = Π1(Ψ) with
Ψ ⊆ C2 as in Theorem 3.5.
(ii) The maximal valid ideal selections are precisely the sets Eψ = Π1({ψ})
with ψ ∈ C2 \ {0}.
(ii) The alternatives are precisely the pairs 0¯, 1¯ and the pairs Eφ,Eψ with
nonzero, orthogonal φ, ψ ∈ C2.
(iv) The states of E have the form Π = Π1(Ψ), where Ψ contains exactly
one nonzero vector from each pair of orthogonal one-dimensional subspaces
of C2. In particular, no ideal selection is a state.
Proof. This is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 3.5 and Example
2.9. ⊓⊔
The wish to extend this result to more general situations suggests the follow-
ing open questions. For E = C2×2, the answers to (i) and (ii) are affirmative,
and in (iii), no additional condition is needed.
3.7 Problems.
(i) Is every state a union of maximal valid ideal selections?
(ii) Given a state Σ and an ideal selection Π 6⊆ Σ, is there always an ideal
selection Π′ ⊆ Σ not consistent with Π?
(iii) Let E be a *-algebra (with 1) of linear operators on a Hilbert space H.
If Ψ is a set of vectors from H such that distinct vectors in Ψ are neither
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parallel nor orthogonal, which additional conditions must be imposed on Ψ
to ensure that
Π(Ψ) := {f ∈ E | fψ = 0 for some ψ ∈ Ψ}
is a valid selection?
(iv) Are arbitrarily accurate measurements of position and momentum con-
sistent? More precisely, let pµ and qµ denote the (Hermitian) components of
the canonical position and momentum vectors, with canonical commutation
relations
[pµ, pν ] = [qµ, qν ] = 0, [qµ, pν ] = δµνih
−.
Are the statements ‖p − k‖ ≈< ε and ‖q − x‖ ≈< ε′ (defined in Example
2.4) consistent whenever ε, ε′ > 0?
4 Dynamics
God does not play dice with the universe.
Albert Einstein, 1927 A.D. [8]
In this section we discuss elementary aspects of the dynamics of physical
systems, as far as relevant for the new interpretation. We shall have much
more to say about dynamics in later parts of this series of papers.
The observations about a physical system change with time. The dynamics
of a conservative system is described by a fixed (but system-dependent) one-
parameter family Tt (t ∈ R) of automorphisms of the *-algebra E, i.e.,
mappings Tt : E→ E satisfying (for f, g ∈ E, α ∈ C, s, t ∈ R)
Tt(α) = α, Tt(f
∗) = Tt(f)
∗,
Tt(f + g) = Tt(f) + Tt(g), Tt(fg) = Tt(f)Tt(g),
T0(f) = f, Ts+t(f) = Ts(Tt(f)).
For dissipative systems, a semigroup of mappings Tt, t ≥ 0 with the same
properties replaces the group of automorphisms.
In the Heisenberg picture of the dynamics, where states are fixed and
quantities change with time, f(t) := Tt(f) denotes the Heisenberg quan-
tity associated with f at time t. Note that f(t) is uniquely determined by
f(0) = f . Thus the dynamics is deterministic, independent of whether we
are in a classical or in a quantum setting.
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4.1 Examples. In nonrelativistic mechanics, conservative systems are de-
scribed by a Hermitian quantity H , called the Hamiltonian.
(i) In classical mechanics, a Poisson bracket {·, ·} together with H defines
the Liouville superoperator Lf = {f,H}, and the dynamics is given by
Tt(f) = e
tL(f).
(ii) In quantum mechanics, the dynamics is instead given by
Tt(f) = e
−tH/ih−fetH/ih
−
.
Of course, weak equalities valid at some time need not be valid at other
times. To see what happens, suppose that f ≈ g at time t = 0. Then, in
the Heisenberg picture, f(t) ≈ g(t), i.e., Tt(f) ≈ Tt(g) at time t. Thus, if Π
is the selection of all quantities that can be inferred to vanish at time t = 0
then
Π(t) := {Tt(f) | f ∈ Π}
is the selection of all quantities that can be inferred to vanish at an arbitrary
time t. In particular, a state Σ at time t = 0 develops into the state
Σ(t) := {Tt(f) | f ∈ Σ}
at time t. This describes the Schro¨dinger picture of the state dynamics,
where quantities are fixed and states change with time. Again the dynamics
is deterministic.
In a famous paper, Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen [9] introduced the fol-
lowing criterion for elements of physical reality:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e.,
with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there
exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity
and postulated that
the following requirement for a complete theory seems to be a necessary one:
every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical
theory.
Traditionally, elements of physical reality were thought to have to emerge
in a classical framework with hidden variables. However, to embed quan-
tum mechanics in such a framework is impossible under natural hypotheses
(Kochen & Specker [22]).
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It is therefore interesting to see that, in the present interpretation, each true
weak equality is such an element of physical reality. In this sense, the new
interpretation is a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In particular, one can talk about the state of the universe without the need
of an external observer (Wigner [55]) and without the need to assume the
existence of multiple universes (Everett [10]). Instead of many worlds, the
new interpretation suggests that there is a single world, but one with more
facettes to it than hitherto suspected.
Taking another look at the form of the Schro¨dinger dynamics, we see that
the vanishing quantities (or equivalently the statements) behave just like
the particles in an ideal fluid. We may therefore say that the Schro¨dinger
dynamics describes the flow of truth in an objective, deterministic manner.
On the other hand, the Schro¨dinger dynamics is completely silent about what
is true. Thus, as in mathematics, where all truth is relative to the logical
assumptions made (what is considered true at the beginning of an argument),
in physics truth is relative to the initial values assumed (what is considered
true at time t = 0).
In both cases, theory is about what is consistent, and not about what is
real or true. The formalism enables us only to deduce truth from other
assumed truths. But what is regarded as true is outside the formalism, may
be quite subjective and may even turn out to be contradictory, depending on
the acquired personal habits of self-critical judgment. And finding out what
is ‘really’ true is highly restricted by the quantum mechanical uncertainty
relations (see Section 6); thus different experts can only form more or less
valid approximations to the real truth. This is very much in agreement with
what we see in practice.
What we can possibly know as true are the laws of physics, general rela-
tionships that appear often enough to see the underlying principle (cf. the
remarks about induction in the final section). But concerning states (i.e.,
in practice, boundary conditions) we are doomed to idealized, more or less
inaccurate approximations of reality. Wigner’s [54, p.5] expressed this by
saying, the laws of nature are all conditional statements and they relate only
to a very small part of our knowledge of the world.
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5 Ensembles and probability
We may assume that words are akin to the matter which
they describe; when they relate to the lasting and perma-
nent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalter-
able, and, as far as their nature allows, irrefutable and
immovable – nothing less. But when they express only
the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves,
they need only be likely and analogous to the real words.
As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief.
Plato, ca. 367 A.D. [39]
Only love transcends our limitations. In contrast, our
predictions can fail, our communication can fail, and
our knowledge can fail. For our knowledge is patchwork,
and our predictive power is limited. But when perfection
comes, all patchwork will disappear.
St. Paul, ca. 57 A.D. [37]
The stochastic nature of quantum mechanics is usually discussed in terms
of probabilities. However, from a strictly logical point of view, this has the
drawback that one gets into conflict with the traditional foundation of prob-
ability theory by Kolmogorov [23], which does not extend to the noncom-
mutative case. Mathematical physicists (see, e.g., Parthasarathy [36],
Meyer [28]) developed a far reaching quantum probability calculus based
on Hilbert space theory. But their approach is highly formal, drawing its
motivation from analogies to the classical case rather than from the common
operational meaning.
Whittle [53] presents a much less known alternative approach to classical
probability theory, equivalent to that of Kolmogorov, that treats expectation
as the basic concept and derives probability from axioms for the expectation.
(See the discussion in [53, Section 3.4] why, for historical reasons, this has
remained a minority approach.) The approach via expectations is easy to
motivate, leads quickly to interesting results, and extends without much
trouble to the quantum world, yielding the ensembles (‘mixed states’) of
traditional quantum physics.
The axioms we shall require for meaningful expectations are those trivially
satisfied for weighted averages of a finite ensemble of observations. While
this motivates the form of the axioms and the name ‘ensemble’ attached to
the concept, there is no need at all to interpret expectation as an average;
this is the case only in certain classical situations. In general, the expectation
of a quantity f is simply a value near which, based on the theory, we may
expect the measured value for f . At the same time, the standard deviation
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serves as a measure of the amount to which we may expect this nearness to
deviate from exactness.
5.1 Definition.
(i) An ensemble is a mapping − that assigns to each quantity f ∈ E its
expectation f =: 〈f〉 ∈ C such that for all f, g ∈ E, α ∈ C,
(P1) 〈1〉 = 1, 〈f ∗〉 = 〈f〉∗, 〈f + g〉 = 〈f〉+ 〈g〉,
(P2) 〈αf〉 = α〈f〉,
(P3) If f ≥ 0 then 〈f〉 ≥ 0,
(P4) If fl ∈ E, fl ↓ 0 then inf〈fl〉 = 0.
Here fl ↓ 0 means that the fl converge to 0 and fl+1 ≤ fl for all l.
(ii) The number
cov(f, g) := Re〈(f − f)(g − g)∗〉
is called the covariance of f, g ∈ E, and the number
σ(f) :=
√
cov(f, f)
the standard deviation of f ∈ E.
This definition generalizes the expectation axioms ofWhittle [53] for classi-
cal probability theory. Note that (P3) ensures that σ(f) is a nonnegative real
number that vanishes if f is a constant quantity (i.e., a complex number).
To avoid technicalities about topology and order relations (discussed in a
more detailed treatment in Part III [32]), we don’t use in this section the
topological axiom (P4), and assume that E is either an algebra of functions
or the algebra of bounded linear operators on some Hilbert space, with partial
order relation defined by f ≤ g iff g − f is Hermitian and nonnegative resp.
positive semidefinite. In both cases, for all quantities f, g,
f ∗f ≥ 0, ff ∗ ≥ 0, (2)
g ≥ 0 ⇒ g = g∗ and f ∗gf ≥ 0. (3)
5.2 Examples.
(i) Finite probability theory. In the commutative algebra E = Cn with
pointwise multiplication and componentwise inequalities, every linear func-
tional on E, and in particular every ensemble, has the form
〈f〉 =
n∑
k=1
pkfk (4)
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for certain constants pk. The ensemble axioms hold precisely when the pk
are nonnegative and add up to one; thus 〈f〉 is a weighted average.
By Example 2.8 (applied to Ω = {1, . . . , n}), the states are precisely the sets
Πω = {f ∈ E | fω = 0} with ω ∈ Ω, and the natural probability of a state
Πω in the ensemble defined by (4) is pω. All elementary probability theory
with a finite number of events can be discussed in this setting.
Note that the probability can be recovered from the expectation by means
of the formula
pω = 1−
∑
k 6=ω
pk = 1− sup
{∑
pkfk | fω = 0, f ≤ 1
}
= 1− sup {〈f〉 | f ∈ (Πω)obs, f ≤ 1} .
(5)
(ii) Quantum mechanical ensembles. In the algebra E of bounded linear
operators on a Hilbert space H, traditional quantum mechanics describes
a pure ensemble (traditionally called a ‘pure state’, but this terminology
conflicts with our new interpretation) by the expectation
〈f〉 := ψ∗fψ,
where ψ ∈ H is a unit vector. And quantum thermodynamics describes an
equilibrium ensemble by the expectation
〈f〉 := tr e−S/k
−
f,
where k− > 0 is the Boltzmann constant, and S is a Hermitian observable
with tr e−S/k
−
= 1 called the entropy whose spectrum is discrete and bounded
below. In both cases, the ensemble axioms are easily verified.
5.3 Proposition. For any ensemble,
(i) f ≤ g ⇒ 〈f〉 ≤ 〈g〉.
(ii) If f is Hermitian then f¯ = 〈f〉 is real and
σ(f) =
√
〈(f − f)2〉.
Proof. (ii) follows directly from (P1), and (i) from (P1) and (P3). ⊓⊔
The interpretation of probability has been surrounded by philosophical puz-
zles for a long time; Fine [11] is probably still the best discussion of the
problems involved. Our definition generalizes the classical intuition of prob-
abilities as weights in a weighted average and is modeled after the formula
(5) for finite probability theory in Example 5.2(i).
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In the special case when a well-defined counting process may be associated
with the statement whose probability is assessed, our exposition supports
the conclusion of Drieschner [7, p.73], “probability is predicted relative
frequency” (German original: “Wahrscheinlichkeit ist vorausgesagte relative
Ha¨ufigkeit”). More specifically, we assert that, for counting events, the prob-
ability carries the information of expected relative frequency (see Theorem
5.6(v) below).
To make this precise we need a precise concept of independent events that
may be counted. To motivate our definition, assume that we look at times
t1, . . . , tN for the presence of an event of the sort we want to count. We
introduce observables el whose value is the amount added to the counter
at time tl. For correct counting, we need el ≈ 1 if an event happened at
time tl, and el ≈ 0 otherwise; thus el should have the two possible values
0 and 1 only. Since these numbers are precisely the Hermitian idempotents
among the constant quantities, this suggests to identify events with general
Hermitian idempotent quantities.
5.4 Definition.
(i) A quantity e ∈ E satisfying
e2 = e = e∗
is called an event. Two events e, e′ are independent in an ensemble 〈·〉 if
they commute and satisfy
〈ee′〉 = 〈e〉〈e′〉.
With any event we associate the ideal selection
Πe := E(1− e),
the set of all quantities vanishing as a consequence of e ≈ 1.
(ii) In a given ensemble, the number
pr(Π) := 1− sup{〈f〉 | f ∈ Πobs, f ≤ 1}
is called the probability of the selection Π, and the number 〈e〉 is called the
probability of the event e.
5.5 Examples.
(i) Classical probability theory. In the algebra of bounded complex-
valued functions on a set Ω, every characteristic function e = χM (with
χM(x) = 1 if x ∈M , χM(x) = 0 otherwise) is an event, and
Πe = {f ∈ E | f(x) = 0 for x ∈M},
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Π⊥e = {f ∈ E | f(x) = 0 for x 6∈M}.
(ii) Quantum probability theory. In the algebra of bounded linear op-
erators on a Hilbert space H, every unit vector ψ ∈ H gives rise to an
elementary event e = ψψ∗, and
Πe = {f ∈ E | fψ = 0},
Π⊥e = {φψ
∗ | φ ∈ H}.
(There are also other, nonelementary events.)
5.6 Theorem.
(i) For any event e, its negation ¬e = 1− e is also an event, with
Π¬e = Ee = Π
⊥
e . (6)
Moreover, if the weak equality e ≈ λ (λ ∈ C) can be deduced from a consis-
tent statement then λ ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) For commuting events e, e′, the observables
e ∧ e′ = ee′, e ∨ e′ = e+ e′ − ee′
are also events. Their probabilities satisfy
〈e ∧ e′〉+ 〈e ∨ e′〉 = 〈e〉+ 〈e′〉,
〈e〉+ 〈¬e〉 = 1.
Moreover,
〈e ∧ e′〉 = 〈e〉〈e′〉 for independent events e, e′.
(iii) For any selection Π, we have 0 ≤ pr(Π) ≤ 1.
(iv) For any event e,
pr(Πe) = 〈e〉, pr(Π
⊥
e ) = 1− 〈e〉.
In particular, 0 ≤ 〈e〉 ≤ 1.
(v) For a family of events el (l = 1, . . . , N) with constant probability 〈el〉 = p,
the relative frequency
q :=
1
N
N∑
l=1
el
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satisfies
〈q〉 = p;
if the events are independent,
σ(q) =
√
p(1− p)
N
.
becomes arbitrarily small as N becomes large (weak law of large num-
bers).
(We remark in passing that, with the operations ∧,∨,¬, the set of events in
any commutative subalgebra of E forms a Boolean algebra; see Stone [47].)
Proof. (i) Clearly ¬e is Hermitian, and (¬e)2 = (1 − e)2 = 1 − 2e + e2 =
1 − e = ¬e. Hence 1 − e is an event. The left equality in (6) holds by
definition. Since (fe)(g(1− e))∗ = f(e− e2)g∗ = 0, we have Ee ⊆ Π⊥e . But if
f ∈ Π⊥e then f(1− e)
∗ = 0, hence f = fe ∈ Ee, so that Ee = Π⊥e . Hence (6)
holds. Finally, suppose that e ≈ λ. Then 0 ≈ λ− e by (R4), and by (R5),
0 ≈ (1− λ− e)(λ− e) = λ(1− λ)− e+ e2 = λ− λ2.
If λ 6= 0, 1, we may multiply on the left by the complex number (λ − λ2)−1
and find the contradiction 0 ≈ 1. Hence λ ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) Since e and e′ commute, (ee′)∗ = e′∗e∗ = e′e = ee′, hence ee′ is Hermitian;
and it is idempotent since (ee′)2 = ee′ee′ = e2e′2 = ee′. Finally, e+ e′− ee′ =
1−(1−e)(1−e′) = ¬(¬e∧¬e′) is an event. The assertions about expectations
are immediate.
(iii) Since, by Proposition 5.3(i), 〈f〉 ≤ 1 for all f ≤ 1, we have 0 ≤ pr(Π),
and since 0 ∈ Π, we have pr(Π) ≤ 1.
(iv) Let Π = Π⊥e . If f ∈ Πobs then f = ge for some g ∈ E, hence fe = ge
2 =
ge = f and ef = e∗f ∗ = (fe)∗ = f ∗ = f . Now f ≤ 1 implies 1−f ≥ 0, hence
e−f = e2−efe = e∗(1−f)e ≥ 0, so that 〈f〉 ≤ 〈e〉. Therefore pr(Π) ≥ 1−〈e〉.
Equality holds since f = e ∈ Πobs satisfies 1−f = 1−e = (1−e)
∗(1−e) ≥ 0,
hence f ≤ 1. Thus pr(Π⊥e ) = 1− 〈e〉. Replacing e by ¬e and noting (i) gives
pr(Πe) = 〈e〉.
(v) 〈q〉 = p follows from
〈q〉 =
1
N
(〈e1〉+ . . .+ 〈eN〉) =
1
N
(p+ . . .+ p) = p.
To get the expression for σ(q) when the events are independent, we first note
that
q2 =
1
N2
(∑
j
ej
)(∑
k
ek
)
= N−2
∑
j,k
ejek.
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In the expectation of this sum we get N2−N contributions of size 〈ej〉〈ek〉 =
p2 and N contributions of size 〈e2j〉 = 〈ej〉 = p. Hence
〈q2〉 = N−2(Np+ (N2 −N)p2),
σ(q)2 = 〈(q − p)2〉 = 〈q2〉 − 2p〈q〉+ p2 = p(1− p)/N.
⊓⊔
Applied to ideal measurements in a pure ensemble, our recipe for the prob-
ability just gives the classical squared probability amplitude formula:
5.7 Corollary. Let φ be a unit vector in a Hilbert space H. In the algebra
E of bounded linear operators on H, the probability that a maximal ideal
selection of the form
Πφ = {f ∈ C
n×n | fφ = 0}
is valid in a given ensemble is
pr(Πφ) = 〈φφ
∗〉.
In particular, for a pure ensemble described by the unit vector ψ ∈ H, the
probability that Πφ is valid is
pr(Πφ) = |φ
∗ψ|2. (7)
Proof. By Example 5.5(iii), Πφ = Πe with e = φφ
∗, and by Theorem 5.6(iv),
pr(Πφ) = 〈e〉 = 〈φφ
∗〉. In particular, for a pure ensemble described by the
unit vector ψ ∈ H, we have pr(Πφ) = 〈φφ
∗〉 = ψ∗φφ∗ψ = |φ∗ψ|2. ⊓⊔
Equation (7) replaces the traditional interpretation of |φ∗ψ|2 as the probabil-
ity that after preparing a pure ensemble in ‘state’ ψ, an ideal measurement
causes a ‘state reduction’ to the new pure ‘state’ φ. Note that the new inter-
pretation of |φ∗ψ|2 is completely within the formal framework of the theory
and completely independent of the measurement process.
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6 Uncertainty
The lot is cast into the lap; but its every decision is from
the LORD.
King Solomon, ca. 1000 B.C. [46]
As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my
ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your
thoughts.
The LORD, according to Isaiah, ca. 540 B.C. [16]
Enough, if we adduce probabilities as likely as any others;
for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and you
who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to
accept the tale which is probable and enquire no further.
Plato, ca. 367 B.C. [39]
The common form and deterministic nature of the dynamics, independent
of any assumption of whether the system is classical or quantum, implies
that there is no difference in the causality of classical mechanics and that of
quantum mechanics. Therefore, the differences between classical mechanics
and quantum mechanics cannot lie in an assumed intrinsic indeterminacy of
quantum mechanics contrasted to deterministic classical mechanics.
In the new interpretation of quantum mechanics, no new principle needs
to be invoked. As in statistical physics, the stochastic nature of quantum
mechanics can be explained simply by our inability to prepare experiments
with a sufficient degree of sharpness to pin down the state of the system.
A ‘prepared state’ is not really a state, in fact we usually know little with
certainty, and never everything. Thus we need to describe the preparation
of experiments in a stochastic language that permits the discussion of such
uncertainties; in other words, we shall model prepared experiments by en-
sembles.
Formally, the essential difference between classical mechanics and quantum
mechanics in the latter’s lack of commutativity. While in classical mechanics
there is in principle no limit to the accuracy with which we can approximate
a desired state, the quantum mechanical uncertainty relation for noncom-
muting observables puts severe limits on the ability to prepare microscopic
ensembles. Here, preparation is defined as bringing the system into an ensem-
ble such that certain specified weak equalities hold to an accuracy specified
by an explicit standard deviation.
We now discuss the limits of the extent to which this can be done.
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6.1 Theorem.
(i) The Cauchy–Schwarz inequality
|〈fg∗〉|2 ≤ 〈ff ∗〉〈gg∗〉
holds for all f, g ∈ E.
(ii) The uncertainty relation
σ(f)2σ(g)2 ≥ | cov(f, g)|2 +
∣∣ 1
2
〈fg∗ − gf ∗〉
∣∣2
holds for all f, g ∈ E.
(iii) For f, g ∈ E,
cov(f, g) = 1
2
(σ(f + g)2 − σ(f)2 − σ(g)2), (8)
| cov(f, g)| ≤ σ(f)σ(g), (9)
σ(f + g) ≤ σ(f) + σ(g). (10)
Proof. (i) For arbitrary α, β ∈ C we have
0 ≤ 〈(αf − βg)(αf − βg)∗〉
= αα∗〈ff ∗〉 − αβ∗〈fg∗〉 − βα∗〈gf ∗〉+ ββ∗〈gg∗〉
= |α|2〈ff ∗〉 − 2Re(αβ∗〈fg∗〉) + |β|2〈gg∗〉
We now choose β = 〈fg∗〉, and obtain for arbitrary real α the inequality
0 ≤ α2〈ff ∗〉 − 2α|〈fg∗〉|2 + |〈fg∗〉|2〈gg∗〉. (11)
Now 〈gg∗〉 ≥ 0 by (P3). If 〈gg∗〉 > 0 we can choose α = 〈gg∗〉 and obtain
0 ≤ 〈gg∗〉2〈ff ∗〉 − 〈gg∗〉|〈fg∗〉|2.
After division by 〈gg∗〉, we find that (i) holds. And if 〈gg∗〉 = 0 then 〈fg∗〉 = 0
since otherwise a tiny α produces a negative right hand side in (11). Thus
(i) also holds in this case.
(ii) Since (f − f¯)(g − g¯)∗ − (g − g¯)∗(f − f¯) = fg∗ − g∗f , it is sufficient to
prove the uncertainty relation for the case of quantities f, g whose expectation
vanishes. In this case,
(Re〈fg∗〉)2 + (Im〈fg∗〉)2 = |〈fg∗〉|2 ≤ 〈ff ∗〉〈gg∗〉 = σ(f)2σ(g)2.
The assertion follows since Re〈fg∗〉 = cov(f, g) and
i Im〈fg∗〉 = 1
2
(〈fg∗〉 − 〈fg∗〉∗) = 1
2
〈fg∗ − gf ∗〉.
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(iii) Again, it is sufficient to consider the case of quantities f, g whose expec-
tation vanishes. Then
σ(f + g)2 = 〈(f + g)(f + g)∗〉 = 〈ff ∗〉+ 〈fg∗ + gf ∗〉+ 〈gg∗〉
= σ(f)2 + 2 cov(f, g) + σ(g)2,
(12)
and (8) follows. (9) is an immediate consequence of (ii), and (10) follows
easily from (12) and (9). ⊓⊔
In the classical case of commuting Hermitian quantities, the uncertainty re-
lation just reduces to the well-known inequality (9) of classical statistics. For
noncommuting Hermitian quantities, the uncertainty relation is stronger. In
particular, we may deduce Heisenberg’s [13, 41] uncertainty relation
σ(q)σ(p) ≥ 1
2
h−
for a pair of conjugate observables p, q, characterized by [q, p] = ih− and
Hermiticity. Thus no ensemble can be prepared where both p and q have
arbitrarily small standard deviation. (More general noncommuting Hermitian
observables f, g may have some ensembles with σ(f) = σ(g) = 0, namely
among those with 〈fg〉 = 〈gf〉.)
We conclude that, similar to the case discussed by Schaller & Svozil [43]
of a universe generated by a universal discrete computation, in a universe
containing a conjugate pair of observables, an internal observer bound to the
laws of this universe cannot investigate completely the detailed properties of
the system. However, an external super-observer (viewing this universe as a
kind of huge computer game and having access to the simulation code) might
well know everything; at least, the present paper shows such a view to be
consistent with the mathematics of quantum mechanics.
It is worthwhile to expand the understanding of the uncertainty relation by
relating it to the restricted additivity of weak equalities in (R6).
6.2 Proposition. Let p, q be Hermitian quantities satisfying [q, p] = ih−.
Then, for any k, x ∈ R and any positive ∆p,∆q ∈ R,
(p− k
∆p
)2
+
(q − x
∆q
)2
≥
h−
∆p∆q
. (13)
Proof. The quantities b = (q − x)/∆q and c = (p − k)/∆p are Hermitian
and satisfy [b, c] = [q, p]/∆q∆p = iκ where κ = h−/∆q∆p. Now the assertion
follows from
0 ≤ (b+ ic)∗(b+ ic) = b2 + c2 + i[b, c] = b2 + c2 − κ.
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⊓⊔
Because of Proposition 5.3, the left hand side of (13) cannot have arbitrar-
ily small expectation. Example 2.4(iii) implies the even stronger statement
that the possible values that a measurement of the left hand side of (13)
can give are the odd positive multiples of the right hand side. (Indeed, this
is the spectrum, since a := κ−1/2(b + ic) is a standard annihilation opera-
tor.) However, since p and q do not commute, it is not permitted to deduce
from this that the summands (p−k
∆p
)2 and ( q−x
∆q
)2 cannot be both small. Thus
we see that noncommutativity together with the restricted additivity (R6)
of weak equalities work together to avoid contradictions between the uncer-
tainty principle and possibly precise knowledge of position and momentum;
cf. Problem 3.7.
This points to a significant difference between preparation and measurement.
The two concepts describe quite different activities: In an experiment, prepa-
ration always precedes measurement; in particular, experiments require a
distinguished direction of time since the time reverse of an experiment rarely
makes sense.
Moreover, measurement produces new knowledge (‘elements of physical real-
ity’ in form of weak equations or inequalities) about a system, while prepa-
ration assumes statistical knowledge of past behavior of the components of
a system (‘elements of physical probability’ in form of an ensemble) without
any measurement of the prepared system.
Thus the preparation of systems is provably limited by the uncertainty rela-
tion for ensembles, while measuring systems seems not to be limited in the
same way. As mentioned in Section 2, ideal measurements (corresponding
to rays in Hilbert space, hence mathematically equivalent to pure ensembles
and subject to the uncertainty relation) are adequate descriptors for (ideal-
ized) measurement processes only if these can be considered instantaneous
(Wigner [56, pp.284-288]).
Therefore, the key to getting more complete information about any micro-
scopic system seems to be that one measures properties of the system at a
number of different times and reconstructs by statistical methods the most
likely values of the variables of interest, even of conjugate variables like po-
sition and momentum.
An example for this are the particle tracks routinely reconstructed in high
energy experiments (see, e.g., Bock et al. [2]) on the silent assumption thay
the particles have definite paths at all times. These paths are approximated
by least squares techniques and provide highly accurate knowledge about
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both position and momentum of the particles involved.
Thus, for sufficiently small subsystems and sufficiently large measuring de-
vices, it seems possible in principle in the new framework to find out arbi-
trarily precisely what has happened, after the fact. But, since measurements
influence the system, this is not possible in a way that would allow the precise
prediction of the fate of such a system in the future, to prepare an ensemble
that would violate the uncertaintly relations.
To which extent one can pin down the ‘true’ state of a system is one of the
challenges the new interpretation of quantum mechanics given here offers.
And, considering the possible impact on clarifying the options in quantum
computing, it might be a challenge with immense practical consequences.
One of the basic questions, not yet decided either theoretically or experimen-
tally, is whether we can prepare a two-level quantum system (a single spin)
sharp enough to ensure more than a single bit of information (the obvious
limit in the classical case). As we have seen in Theorem 3.6 a potentially in-
finite amount of information is contained in a quantum spin state. And the
prospective builders of quantum computers hope that one can exploit the
quantum properties to beat the classical limitations on computing power.
See, e.g., Shor [45], Braunstein [3].
However, such a highly informative quantum spin ensemble would have a
very rugged dependence of the spin on the direction in which it is measured,
and no one knows how one should prepare such an ensemble. Preparing the
spin to have a fixed value in one particular direction only gives a probability
distribution for the values in other directions, that decreases with the cosine
of the angle between a measured direction and the prepared direction (Neu-
maier [29]). The question is whether a system can be prepared in a way
that this probability distribution can be sharpened...
7 Knowledge and physical reality
The man who thinks he knows something does not yet
know as he ought to know.
St. Paul, ca. 57 A.D. [38]
Let me discuss here a philosophical statement about the nature of the world
and its relation to what physicists do.
1. States are (objective existence) and change in a deterministic fashion.
2. Statements are assumed to be known (deliberate choice using subjective
assessment) and change in a deterministic fashion.
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3. Ensembles are prepared (belief calibrated by past observations) and give
rise to stochastic indeterminacy based on incomplete knowledge, that
for systems involving a pair of conjugate observables is unavoidable in
principle.
4. Measurements are performed (subjective experience calibrated by train-
ing) and are stochastically distributed according to the results of the
quantum mechanical formalism with input from 1.–3.
Expectations are primarily properties not of reality itself but of the ensemble
assigned to a system. The latter depends on our assessment of reality, i.e.,
on the assumed preparation of the device. Thus ensembles only express our
conjectures (or even prejudice) about reality, and must be brought into agree-
ment with reality by measurement (finding something out about a system),
pattern recognition (identifying a substance as hydrogen, say, by means of
a few measurements, and implying then all properties of hydrogen for the
whole substance), or preparation of an experiment (arranging subsystems
whose properties are assumed to be known). In actual practice, ensembles
are always abstractions from reality accurate only to a certain extent, and
this accuracy is assessed by a measurement-assisted subjective interpretation
of reality.
From a practical point of view, theory defines what an object is: A gas is con-
sidered as ideal gas, and a solid as a crystal, if it behaves, to our satisfaction,
as a model of an ideal gas, or a crystal, predicts. And in preparing experi-
ments one uses equipment supposed to produce a predictable environment; cf.
Wigner’s [54, p.5] statement, [In these] machines, the functioning of which
he can foresee, [...] the physicist creates a situation in which all relevant
coordinates are known so that the behavior of the machine can be predicted.
Thus, in practice, one never ‘prepares a state’ by what, in the traditional
foundation of quantum mechanics, is known as an ideal measurement; in-
stead, ensembles are prepared by well-informed assumptions concerning one’s
equipment. (And if experiments don’t give the expected results one usually
first checks whether these assumptions were justified!)
Our knowledge about prepared ensembles is obtained only via the observed
behavior in the past in similar situations. This is the operational meaning of
the ensemble – it is an ensemble chosen on the basis of subjective knowledge
about past situations that we hope is representative enough to tell us about
future events.
We know that certain materials or machines reliably produce ensembles that
depend only on variables that are accounted for in our theory and that are
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either fixed or controllable. More precisely, we assume that we know this, on
the basis of past experience, claims of manufacturers, occasional measure-
ments and consistency checks, etc.. Our measure of reliability is a subjective
sense of our satisfaction, or the satisfaction of others whom we trust, who
checked that certain norms are satisfied. If we are careless or credulous, our
subjective knowledge will be far off the mark, and the expectations based on
it will simply not be matched by reality.
This interface between what we understand and what is, between model and
reality, between theory and experiment, between calculated expectations and
measurements always remains a subjective matter. It is ultimately based
on trust in measurement devices, apparatus specifications, published data,
etc., or perhaps rather based on trust in the people (including ourselves)
responsible for them.
The strength of theoretical physics lies in the fact that it can ignore this sub-
jective side by assuming ensembles to be given, which allows one to calculate
expectations from well-defined assumptions. The weakness of theoretical
physics lies in the impossibility to objectively verify these assumptions; com-
parison with reality always rests on trust in subjective aspects of observation
and communication. Science is possible only because (and in as much as) it
is possible to make these subjective aspects less influential by training people
to adhere to high standards of precision, carefulness and truthfulness.
The new interpretation makes this gap between model and reality very ex-
plicit by giving precise concepts of states, ensembles and expectations. In
this way it frees theoretical physics from philosophical riddles by a careful
cut just at the point where objective expectations and their subjective inter-
pretation interact; all these riddles are pushed to the subjective side of the
cut.
In this sense, this paper can be viewed as a mathematical commentary on the
statement of Margenau [26], Measurement is ... the contact of reason with
nature. A three volume work [24, 48, 25] on the foundations of measurements
gives a comprehensive survey of – partially successful – attempts to extend
the realm of objectivity further by axiomatizing the measurement process
in classical physics. The problems involved for the quantum case are well
covered in the reprint collection of Wheeler & Zurek [52]. However, one
cannot avoid making the transition to subjective judgment at some stage,
and the setting proposed in the present paper has the great advantage of
simplicity.
Since this gap between model and reality forms a built-in part of our ax-
iomatic treatment, the latter gives a satisfactory account for the well-known
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problem of induction. Nothing can guarantee that any model is true, even
when truth is restricted to ‘within a specified accuracy’. (Shall I prove that
you live forever? You experienced all your past birthdays, without a sin-
gle exception. Invoking Ockham’s razor [35, 15], frustra fit per plura quod
potest fieri per pauciora – that we should opt for the most economic model
explaining a regularity, we conclude that this will go on for ever!! But, of
course, this proves nothing.)
I dreamt that I was in Hell, and that Hell is a place full of
all those happenings that are improbable but not impossi-
ble. [...] every time that they have made an induction, the
next instance falsifies it. This, however, happens only dur-
ing the first hundred years of their damnation. After that,
they learn to expect that an induction will be falsified, and
therefore it is not falsified until another century of logical
torment has altered their expectation. Throughout all eter-
nity surprise continues, but each time at a higher logical
level.
B. Russell, 1954 A.D. [42]
But any existing regularity or structure in our world can be discovered by
means of induction: diligent observation and good theory allows us to for-
mulate the observed regularities as mathematical models. And why can we
discover laws of nature? Because they can be formulated with few words and
formulas – so a limited amount of plausible information allows us to guess
correctly with almost certainty any law of limited complexity that actually
exists. This is confirmed by results ofWebb [51] that, at least in applications
to machine learning – the automatic discovery of descriptions of massive sets
of data from an accessible subset of data –, low complexity seems to be an
essential element in the appropriateness of Ockham’s razor.
Thus induction works in physics not for logical reasons, but because nature is
so highly structured. That the latter is the case follows from our overwhelming
success in describing nature by means of concepts and laws of physics. If any
method can be effective in describing complex structural patterns in nature,
it must use mathematics, the science of exact concepts and their relations.
Thus the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences
(Wigner [54]) is explained by the plain assumption that nature possesses
highly accurate laws of limited complexity that are universally valid and
allow one to explain and predict so much about our universe.
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8 Epilogue
The axiomatic foundation given here of the basic principles underlying the-
oretical physics suggest that, from a formal point of view, the differences
between classical physics and quantum physics are only marginal (though in
the quantum case, the lack of commutativity requires some care and causes
deviations from classical behavior). In both cases, everything flows from the
same assumptions simply by changing the realization of the axioms.
It is remarkable that, in the setting of Poisson algebras described and ex-
plored in later parts of this series of papers, this remains so even as we go
deeper into the details of dynamics and thermodynamics.
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